In this paper, we analyse Ma signcryption scheme [4] proposed in Inscrypt'2006. Although Ma signcryption scheme [4] is probably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and forgery, we show that Ma signcryption scheme is easily forgeable by the receiver and the receiver can impersonate the sender to forge any valid signcryption to any receiver.
Introduction
Since the concept of a signcryption scheme was introduced by Zheng [10] in 1997, many attempts to construct insider-secure signcryption scheme, for example, LibertQuisquater scheme with key privacy [2] , Libert-Quisquater scheme based on q-Diffie-Hellman problem [3] and YangWong-Deng signcryption scheme [9] . All of the above signcryption schemes were provably insider-secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks in random oracle model. But, Tan [6] - [8] disproved their claims and showed that all the above mentioned signcryption schemes are not insidersecure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in 2005 and 2006 respectively. In 2006, Ma [4] proposed a new signcryption scheme and proved that it is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack and forgery. In this paper, we show that Ma signcryption scheme does not satisfy the basic requirement for preventing receiver from forgery. We provide two kinds of forgeries; one is the message modification which means that the receiver forges any message for himself and proves to the trusted third party that it is generated by the legitimate sender. The second attack is that the receiver impersonates the sender and forges a valid ciphertext to any public key with unknown receiver. This attack, called key substitution attack, is similar to the unknown key-share attacks [1] on key agreement protocol or key substitution attacks [5] on signature scheme. In applications, we give the following two different scenarios on two attacks.
(a) In an electronic payment systems, a buyer (sender) is agreed to pay 10 dollar for the goods that he/she brought from the merchant. Then he/she signcrypts a message and sends it to the merchant. The merchant will modify the amount to be 100 dollar and forge a signcryption. When the dispute arises, the merchant prove to the trusted third party that the (forged) ciphertext is generated by the buyer.
(b) In a contract signing, a company A signs a contract with a company B and agrees to award a contract to company B for a job J. The company A then signcrypts the contract and sends it to the company B. If the company B also knows that company A has another job K, then the company B generates another contract (forge the message of company A) awards to company C (this company is created by company B of new public key) for job K. If there is a dispute, the company C can prove to the trusted third party that the contract is a valid contract signcrypted by the company A.
Ma's Short Signcryption Scheme
A signcryption scheme normally involves three algorithms, that is, key generation, signcrypt generation and designcrypt. Now, we describe Ma signcryption scheme [4] as follows:
Key Generation: Given the security parameters l and n. Let p be a prime number such that 2 n > p > 2 l and G 1 and G 2 be groups of the same prime order p. Let P be a generator of G 1 and e be a bilinear map such that e : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 . Consider a user u, he first chooses a random x u ∈ Z p and computes P u = x u P. Then, the public key of a user u is P u and the private key is x u . We denote the sender and the receiver by s and r respectively and their private and public key pairs are (x s , P s ) and (x r , P r ) respectively. Let H 1 , H 2 and H 3 be cryptographic hash functions such that
n and H 3 : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} l . Let (E, D) be a secure symmetric-key encryption scheme against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, where E and D are the encryption algorithm and decryption algorithm respectively.
Signcrypt: To signcrypt a message m ∈ {0, 1}
* for the intended user r, the sender s first chooses a random t ∈ {0, 1} n and computes the following:
Then, the ciphertext is C = (V, W, Z).
De-signcrypt:
Upon receipt of a ciphertext C = (V, W, Z), the receiver r computes t = W ⊕ H 2 (V, P r , x r V) and (m P s ) = D k (Z) where k = H 3 (t). If e(V, P s + (H 1 (m) + t)P) = e(P, P), then output m, otherwise reject the ciphertext.
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To provide public verification, the author [4] mentioned that t can be made public as there is no information leak about x r . Upon receipt of t, m and C, the trusted third party verifies the ciphertext by checking e(V, P s + (H 1 (m) + t)P) = e(P, P).
Forgery of Ma's Short Signcryption Scheme
In this section, we show two attacks that the receiver can forge any signcrypt message. One is called message modification attack and the other is called key substitution attack. This means that the attacker (without knowing the secret key of the sender) can generate any valid ciphertext on behave of the sender. The two attacks are described as follows:
Attack 1: Message Modification Attack
In this attack, the receiver r modifies the message and proves to the trusted third party that it is sent by the legitimate sender. Upon receipt of a ciphertext C = (V, W, Z) from the sender, The receiver first de-signcrypts the ciphertext C by computing
. If e(V, P s + (H 1 (m) + t)P) e(P, P), then reject the ciphertext, otherwise, for any messagem, the receiver r generates any valid ciphertextĈ for the sender s as follows:
Then the ciphertext isĈ = (V,Ŵ,Ẑ). The receiver sends this ciphertextĈ together withm andt to the trusted third party to prove that the legitimate sender signcrypted the messagem. The trusted third party checks the validity of signature by e(V, P s + (H 1 (m) +t)P) = e(P, P). Hence, the trusted third party convinces that the sender signcrypted the messagem.
Attack 2: Key Substitution Attack
In this attack, the receiver r forges any message for any public key Pr of unknown userr such that Pr = yP r = yx r P for any y ∈ Z * p with private key xr = yx r . Upon receipt of a ciphertext C = (V, W, Z) from the sender, The receiver first de-signcrypts the ciphertext C by comput-
. If e(V, P s + (H 1 (m) + t)P) e(P, P), then reject the ciphertext, otherwise, for any messagem, the receiver r generates any valid ciphertext for the sender s to an unknown user of a public key Pr = yP r as follows: t = H 1 (m) + t − H 1 (m) mod p, vPr = vyx r P = xrV, W =t ⊕ H 2 (V, Pr, vPr),k = H 3 (t),Ẑ = Eˆk(m P s ).
Then the ciphertext isĈ = (V,Ŵ,Ẑ). If the trusted third party is given a ciphertextĈ,m andt, then the trusted third party can easily check the validity of signcryption by checking e(V, P s +(H 1 (m)+t)P) = e(P, P). Hence, the trusted third party is convinced that the sender signcrypted the messagê m.
Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that Ma signcryption scheme does not fulfill the basic requirement of unforgeability. We demonstrate two forgery's attacks on Ma signcryption scheme and conclude that Ma signcryption scheme is insecure.
